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“I have had dreams and I have had nightmares, but I have
conquered my nightmares because of my dreams.”
—Jonas Salk1
INTRODUCTION
The symbiosis between dream and nightmare now seems to be playing out
with regard to the Internet. Some two decades ago, it was possible to dream
about the benevolence of the Internet as “a fast-growing emblem of national
economic and social vitality[,] . . . an unlimited virtual marketplace for the
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version of this paper was delivered at the conference entitled “Transnational Cyber Attacks: The Rapidly
Evolving Threat to National Security and Legal Response” at the University of Notre Dame (USA) in
England, June 27, 2019. The author thanks Professor Jimmy Gurulé for his generous invitation. The
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1
This quotation is attributed without clear foundation to Jonas Salk, who can certainly claim to have
developed his dream of a successful polio vaccine. Did Jonas Salk say “I have had dreams and I have
had nightmares,” etc.? Where?, SKEPTICS STACK EXCHANGE (2015), https://skeptics.
stackexchange.com/questions/27624/did-jonas-salk-say-i-have-had-dreams-and-i-have-had-nightmaresetc-where.
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propagation and sale of ideas, goods and services on a global scale.”2 Everyone
could dream of the Internet as a harbinger of progress, with slogans such as
“[t]he information wants to be free”3 and directions to authorities that “You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”4
Surprisingly, the authorities in the West responded sympathetically and
entrenched in law the supportive notion that communications service providers
(CSPs) are content-neutral pipelines rather than content controllers. This stance
is reflected in the United States’ Communications Decency Act5 and the
European Union’s E-Commerce Directive.6 Such policies reflect an optimistic
desire to foster Internet growth by encouraging investment and innovation.
However, the optimism is now beset by risks, abuses, and scares that have
taken the gloss off the promise of the Internet and the indulgence afforded to
Internet operators. The exploitation of private information for commercial
profit7 and tax avoidance, form part of the nightmares,8 leading to further
reproaches about unfair competition within the digital sector,9 and from offline
retailers,10 and media outlets.11 Next, the Internet of Things (IoT) promises to
enhance everyday objects but also connects to an IoT platform, so that “the
resulting data continuously flows into big data at every node.”12 Ordinary objects
become “smart objects” with the capability of actively participating in business
transactions.13 The IoT also enhances military competency by equipping

2

CLIVE WALKER, DAVID WALL & YAMAN AKDENIZ, THE INTERNET, LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (2000).
R. Polk Wagner, Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control Essay, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
995, 999 n.14 (2003) (attributing the quote to Stewart Brand in 1984). See also McKenzie Wark,
Information Wants to Be Free (But Is Everywhere in Chains), 20 CULTURAL STUD. 165, 173 (2006);
CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR THE INTERNET AGE (2014).
4
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
5
47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). See also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010). On liability for threats and terrorism incitements, see Michelle Roter, With
Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: Imposing a “Duty to Take Down” Terrorist Incitement on
Social Media, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2017); Jaime M. Freilich, Note, Section 230’s Liability
Shield in the Age of Online Terror Recruitment, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 675, 678 (2018).
6
Council Directive on Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 11–12 (EC). See also ARNO R.
LODDER & ANDREW D. MURRAY, EU REGULATION OF E-COMMERCE: A COMMENTARY (Elgar
Comment. Series, 2017); JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
(4th ed. 2019).
7
See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
8
See COMM. OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, REPORT ON TAX AVOIDANCE–GOOGLE, 2012-13, HC 112 (UK);
HM TREASURY, CORP. TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECON.: POSITION PAPER, 2017 (UK).
9
THE DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, 2019 (UK).
10
HOUSE OF COMMONS HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOV’T COMM., HIGH STREETS AND
TOWN CENTRES IN 2030, 2017-19, HC 1010 (UK).
11
See CLIVE WALKER & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, FREE SPEECH IN AN INTERNET ERA (2013);
CAIRNCROSS REV., A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR JOURNALISM (2019), https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/778021/021119_THE_CAIR
NCROSS_REVIEW_A_sustainable_future_for_journalism.pdf.
12
Giuseppe Russo et al., Exploring Regulations and Scope of the Internet of Things in Contemporary
Companies: A First Literature Analysis, 4 J. INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 11 (2015); The term
“IoT encompasses everything connected to the internet, but it is increasingly being used to define objects
that ‘talk’ to each other.” Matt Burgess, What is the Internet of Things? WIRED Explains, WIRED (Feb.
16, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/internet-of-things-what-is-explained-iot.
13
Rolf H. Weber, Internet of Things – Governance Quo Vadis?, 29 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 341,
341 (2013).
3

58

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:1

combatants with high-tech combat gear embedded with biometric wearables.14
Security and privacy are nightmares for IoT’s consumers, because smart objects
can generate and store data,15 which are then susceptible to denial-of-service
attacks, ransomware attacks, and hacking attacks that use malware.16 All the
“online harms” that allegedly arise17 were the subject of a recent U.K.
government discussion paper with that title.18 Among the twenty-three listed
harms are: pornography and indecency, terrorism,19 harassment and
intimidation, hatred, dangerous, unregulated, or untaxed goods, and
disinformation (including fake news). Some aspects, such as the impacts on
elections20 and disinformation,21 have been taken up by further inquiries.
Broader unsavoury aspects, such as threats to privacy (notably, the misdeeds of
Cambridge Analytica and Facebook), are less clearly identified, but certainly
have been condemned by the U.K. Information Commissioner.22
This Online Harms agenda is the stuff of nightmares, especially as aspects
go beyond existing criminality and create the further nightmare of the
government as the arbiter of truth.23 The targets of the Online Harms document
primarily comprise a domestic agenda and do not encompass the external threat
of transnational cyberattacks, which is the subject of this paper. The reason for
silence about transnational cyberattacks in the Online Harms document relates
to bureaucratic demarcations in the U.K. administration. Other existential
nightmares are tackled in a different set of documentation, namely the current
National Cyber Security Strategy 2016–2021. In other words, this document

14
Lori Cameron, Internet of Things Meets the Military and Battlefield: Connecting Gear and
Biometric Wearables for an IoMT and IoBT, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, https://www.computer.org/
publications/tech-news/research/Internet-of-military-battlefield-things-iomt-iobt (last visited Aug. 20,
2019).
15
Rolf H. Weber & Evelyne Studer, Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things: Legal Aspects, 32
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 715, 721 (2016).
16
ROLF H. WEBER & ROMANA WEBER, INTERNET OF THINGS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 44 (2009); Ibrar
Yaqoob et al., The Rise of Ransomware and Emerging Security Challenges in the Internet of Things, 129
COMPUTER NETWORKS: INT’L J. COMPUTER & TELECOMM. NETWORKING 444, 445 (2017).
17
See Julia Davidson et al., Adult Online Hate, Harassment and Abuse: A Rapid Evidence
Assessment, U.K. COUNCIL FOR INTERNET SAFETY (June 2019), https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/811450/Adult_Online_Harms
_Report_2019.pdf.
18
HM GOV’T, WHITE PAPER ON ONLINE HARMS, 2019, CP, 57 ¶ 2.2. (UK). See also HOUSE OF
COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM. WHITE PAPER ON ONLINE HARMS, 2017-19,
HC 2431 (UK).
19
See also COMM. PROPOSAL, REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
ON PREVENTING THE DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST CONTENT ONLINE, 2018, COM (UK).
20
COMM. ON THE STANDARDS OF PUB. LIFE, INTIMIDATION IN PUBLIC LIFE, 2017, CM 9543 (UK);
CABINET OFF. RESPONSE: PROTECTING THE DEBATE: INTIMIDATION, INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION,
2019 (UK).
21
HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM., FINAL REPORT ON
DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”, 2017–19, HC 1791 (UK); HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL,
CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM., DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO THE COMMITTEE’S EIGHTH REPORT, 2017–19, HC 2184 (UK); see also COMM’N COMMUNICATION,
TACKLING ONLINE DISINFORMATION: A EUROPEAN APPROACH, 2018, COM (UK); COMM’N
COMMUNICATION, TACKLING ONLINE DISINFORMATION: COMMISSION PROPOSES AN EU-WIDE CODE OF
PRAC., 2018 (UK).
22
INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA
ANALYTICS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, 2018, (UK); INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., DEMOCRACY DISRUPTED?
PERSONAL INFORMATION AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE, 2018, (UK).
23
See Irini Katsirea, “Fake news”: Reconsidering the Value of Untruthful Expression in the Face of
Regulatory Uncertainty, 10 J. MEDIA L. 2, 159 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/ 17577632. 2019.1573569.
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reflects economic and national security interests, rather than culture and crime
protection.24 It superseded The UK Cyber Security Strategy published in 201125
and reflects the U.K. Government’s broader National Security Strategy 2010,
which identified as a “Tier 1” threat the “[h]ostile attacks upon UK cyberspace
by other states and by large scale cybercrime.”26 Later statements also reflect
that priority.27 According to the European Commission President, Jean Claude
Juncker, “Cyber-attacks can be more dangerous to the stability of democracies
and economies than guns and tanks.”28 Therefore, cybercrime reduction has been
featured as a key priority objective for the European Union ever since the
European Union’s Cybersecurity Strategy of 2013.29
The 2016 U.K. cyber strategy is to defend, deter, and develop.30 The most
tangible initiative was to set up a National Cyber Security Centre that monitors
and responds to major incidents and provides an interface to state security for
the civil sector.31 The strategy reflects a determination that “[w]e will treat a
cyberattack on the UK as seriously as we would an equivalent conventional
attack and we will defend ourselves as necessary.”32 However, the degree of
determination has been questioned by the National Audit Office (NAO) in its
2019 review, Progress of the 2016–2021 National Cyber Security Programme.33
The NAO praises the establishment of the National Cyber Security Centre and
accepts its establishment has led to the reduction of risk. However, it is dubious
about the practicality of some strategic objectives. The House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts also expressed doubts about a weak evidence
base and the lack of a business case.34 These verdicts contrast with the
government’s own more positive current assessment.35
With this background and the desire to prevent dreams from being turned
into nightmares, two main elements of domestic law36 will be tackled in this

24

See HM GOV’T, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, 2016 (UK).
See CABINET OFF., REPORT ON THE U.K. CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: PROTECTING AND
PROMOTING THE U.K. IN A DIGITAL WORLD, 2011 (UK).
26
HM GOV’T, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY,
2010, 25-26 (UK).
27
See HM GOV’T, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REV.,
2015, 40 (UK); HM GOV’T, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC
DEFENCE AND SECURITY REV. 2015, 2016 (UK); HM GOV’T, NATIONAL SECURITY CAPABILITY REVIEW
INCLUDING THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW 2015, 2018 (UK).
28
European Commission Press Release SPEECH/17/3165, President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of
the Union Address (Sep. 13, 2017).
29
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN (July 2, 2013),
https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf.
30
NAT’L CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, supra note 24, at 9.
31
NAT’L CYBER SECURITY CTR., https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
32
NAT’L CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, supra note 24, at 25.
33
NAT’L AUDIT OFF., REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE 2016-2021 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
PROGRAMME, 2019 (UK).
34
HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, REPORT ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE U.K.,
2017-2019, HC 1745 (UK).
35
NAT’L AUDIT OFF., PROGRESS REPORT ON NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021,
2017-2019, HC 1988 (UK).
36
See Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, U.K. Attorney General’s Office, Address at Chatham House
Royal Institute for International Affairs (May 23, 2018) (setting out the U.K.’s official position on
25
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paper. The first element is whether it is possible conceptually to conceive a
meaningful domestic law response to a transnational cyberattack. One must ask,
can law be a valuable instrument to defend, deter, and develop the U.K. against
cyberattacks? This enterprise will involve ontological inquiries to identify a
potential harm as both a “cyberattack” and as “transnational.” Aside from these
ontological debates about the identification of harm, the nature of law as an
appropriate and capable regulatory instrument in cyberspace will then be
examined. A further constraint is that a legal response will only be “meaningful”
if it advances objectives in ways which are efficient and effective, as well as fair.
The second element of the agenda is whether a meaningful domestic law
agenda can be comprehensively devised in response to transnational
cyberattacks. The agenda that can be implemented by law might be both tactical
and operational. At the tactical level, there may be broad duties which relate to
resilience and recovery. At the operational level, mechanisms to be tackled
include police powers, criminal offenses, and sanctions.
I. MEANINGFUL DOMESTIC LAW RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL
CYBERATTACK AS A CONCEPT
Is it possible conceptually to design a meaningful domestic law response to
any transnational cyberattack? Can law be a valuable instrument of the U.K.
National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021’s objectives to defend, deter, and
develop the U.K. in cyberspace?37 This enterprise involves identifying potential
harms as both “cyberattacks” and as “transnational.” Conceptual and definitional
issues thereby arise. Aside from these ontological debates about harm, the nature
of law as an appropriate regulatory instrument in cyberspace must then be
examined.
A. ONTOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL CYBERATTACK
In pursuit of the nature of “cyberattack,” Annex 2, Glossary of the National
Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 advances the following concept, defining a
cyberattack as “deliberate exploitation of computer systems, digitally-dependent
enterprises, and networks to cause harm.”38 This formulation is very broad. For
instance, when the word “harm” is mentioned, we must ask “which harms, by
whom, and how?” An alternative version might make use of the idea that
cyberattacks connote the usage of cyberspace as a mechanism to conduct
“hostile activities.” “Hostile activities” were recently defined in the Counter
Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, schedule 3 paragraph 1 as meaning:

international law), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21stcentury. See also Michael Schmitt, U.S. Cyber Command, Russia and Critical Infrastructure: What
Norms and Laws Apply? JUST SECURITY (June 18, 2019) (discussing Cyber and International Security in
the twenty-first century), https://www.justsecurity.org/64614/u-s-cyber-command-russia-and-criticalinfrastructure-what-norms-and-laws-apply.
37
NAT’L CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, supra note 24, at 9.
38
Id. at 74.
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(5) A person is or has been engaged in hostile activity for the
purposes of this Schedule if the person is or has been concerned
in the commission, preparation or instigation of a hostile act that
is or may be—
(a) carried out for, or on behalf of, a State other than the
United Kingdom, or
(b) otherwise in the interests of a State other than the United
Kingdom.
(6) An act is a “hostile act” if it—
(a) threatens national security,
(b) threatens the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom in a way relevant to the interests of national
security, or
(c) is an act of serious crime. 39
This definition, which is claimed to respond to the attempted poisoning of Sergei
Skripal in Salisbury in 2018, is still far from precise, but it usefully points
towards both seriousness in scale and also state involvement. However, this
formulation may be too narrow to capture all forms of cyberattack. Seriousness
may be intended rather than actual, while state involvement may be hidden.
Next, Professor Hathaway, an expert in international law, has defined
“cyberattack” as “any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer
network for a political or national security purpose.”40 Consequently, she argues
that cyberattacks exist as a separate category from cyber warfare and cybercrime
based on the objective of the attack. Nonetheless, she does not insist on state
involvement. Reflecting further on these formulations, it is helpful to
concentrate on the variables suggested by Professor Masood in her research:41
(1) the identity of the perpetrators, victims, and the targets; (2) the method, scale,
and impact of the attacks; and (3) the motives of the attacks. These variables
better conceptualize cyberattacks and begin to indicate the required responses.42
The first variable in formulating the concept of cyberattacks is the identity
of the perpetrators. The attacks may be domestic or foreign, and they can be
attributed to state or non-state actors, including hackers and hacktivists,
terrorists, criminals, corporations, and insiders. These boundaries can be fluid,
as shown by the employment of U.S. specialists by the United Arab Emirates in

39
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, c.3 (UK); see generally Counter-Terrorism and
Border Security Act 2019: Hostile State Activity Ports Power Fact Sheet, 3, ¶ 1, HOME OFF., (2019) (UK);
See also Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], Note by the Technical Secretariat:
Summary of the Report on Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, TAV/02/18 (Apr. 12, 2018); see also Org. for
the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report
on Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, S/1671/2018 (Sept. 4. 2018).
40
Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 821 (2012).
41
U. Masood, An Analysis of Criminal Liability for Cyber Attacks Under International Law and
Domestic Law, at 33 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leeds) (on file with author).
42
Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney, Cyber-Weapons, 157 RUSI J. 6, 6 (2012); Emilio Iasiello, Are
Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools?, 7 MIL. & STRATEGIC AFF. 23, 29 (Mar. 2015); Ken Barker,
Cyberattack: What Goes Around, Comes Around, 12:17 U. CALGARY SCH. PUB. POL’Y PUBLICATIONS
(2019), https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/sppp/article/view/56877/ 53133.
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its Project Raven.43 Problems of attribution often arise.44 The victims or targets
of cyberattacks may include specific individuals and public or private
organizations.
The second variable in determining the concept of cyberattacks is the
method, scale, and impact of the attacks. Cyberattacks may be committed
outside the situation of armed conflict, but an element of seriousness in impact
is a recurrent and insistent theme. The Tallinn Manual defines cyber operations
as the employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving
objectives “in or by the use of cyberspace.”45 The Government Communications
Headquarters of the U.K. (GCHQ) has released the guideline, “Common Cyber
Attacks: Reducing the Impact” to organizations that are vulnerable to
cyberattacks. According to the guideline, cyberattacks can be mounted using
techniques such as: phishing, water holing, ransomware, scanning, spear
phishing, deploying botnet, and subverting the supply chain.46 Thus, it seems
that the harmfulness of cyberattacks on computer systems and servers fluctuates.
The third variable involves an attack’s motives. A cyberattack is
premeditated, as it requires extensive planning and technical expertise. In
Professor Taylor’s study of hackers, he found hacking for monetary gain is just
one motive. Other reasons include boredom, lack of mental stimulation, peer
recognition, relentless pursuit of power, curiosity, desire to escape from the
restraints of the real world, and jacking (that is, to see if it could be done).47
Furthermore, cyberattacks may be committed for public causes. During
situations of armed conflict, such attacks are undertaken as part of offensive and
defensive military strategy. Apart from states, non-state actors may conduct
cyberattacks to further their political, racial, and religious ideologies.
Cultural and national security priorities also affect the concept of a
cyberattack. For instance, in Malaysia, the term “national security” usually
connotes “public order, racial and religious harmony, economic strength, social
welfare, political stability, and stable government.”48 Most of the participants in
a study conducted by Professor Masood in Malaysia categorized seditious and
defamatory statements as cyberattacks.49 These participants thought that the
maintenance of racial unity is more important than avoiding the disruption of

43
Christopher Bing & Joel Schectman, Project Raven, Inside the UAE’s Secret Hacking Team of
American Mercenaries, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-spying-raven/.
44
See Randall R. Dipert, The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, 9:4 J. MIL. ETHICS 384, 385 (2010); Thomas
Rid & Ben Buchanan, Attributing Cyber Attacks, 38:1-2 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 4 (2015); Kai Ambos,
Individual Criminal Responsibility for Cyber Aggression’, 21:3 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 495 (2016);
Elies van Sliedregt, Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks, 21:3 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 505,
506 (2016); William C. Banks, The Bumpy Road to a Meaningful International Law of Cyber Attribution,
113 AJIL UNBOUND 191 (2019); Berenice Boutin, Shared Responsibility for Cyber Operations, 113 AJIL
UNBOUND 197 (2019); Lorraine Finlay & Christian Payne, The Attribution Problem and Cyber Armed
Attacks 113 AJIL UNBOUND 202 (2019).
45
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, 258 (Michael
N. Schmitt ed., 1st ed. 2013).
46
CESG & CERT-UK, COMMON CYBER ATTACKS: REDUCING THE IMPACT, 2016 (UK).
47
PAUL A. TAYLOR, HACKERS: CRIME IN THE DIGITAL SUBLIME 46 (Routledge ed., 1999).
48
Sani M. Azizuddin, Balancing Freedom of Speech and National Security in Malaysia, 5 ASIAN
POL’Y & POL. 585, 586 (2013).
49
U. Massood, An Analysis of Criminal Liability for Cyber Attacks Under International Law and
Domestic Law (2017) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ. of Leeds) (on file with author).
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computer systems caused by malicious software.50 Thus, the perception of
cyberattacks may vary at the national level, which entails different priorities and
countermeasures.
Based on the above variables, Professor Masood classified cyberattacks in
four categories of cyber wrongdoing: (1) cyber warfare, use of force, unlawful
intervention under international law; (2) cybercrimes; (3) cyber espionage; and
(4) cyber terrorism.51 These categories share similarities in terms of their
methods, impact, and their targets or victims. However, the identity of the
perpetrators and motives of the attacks are different for each category.
This discussion leaves many variables in play, and these are reflected in the
Online Harms document, mentioned above, which also relies on indicative
behaviors to explain harms. Importantly, that document recognizes that some
types of harm are inherently too broad for a legal response (such as
“extremism”). In this way, it remains challenging to differentiate what can be
called an “attack” demanding enhanced legal responses, what is “misuse,” or
what is simply unwelcome behavior, beyond existing law.
It is also difficult to identify the element of “transnationality.” In a sense,
the operation of the network of networks that comprises the Internet is always
transnational. The isolation of a culpable element of transnationality may
encounter major difficulties of proof, as was the case with alleged transnational
attacks in Estonia,52 Georgia,53 and Ukraine.54
The conclusion is that reliance on the term “cyberattack” produces
ontological uncertainties which are especially acute for law, given its claims to
embody rule of law values of clarity and accountability. In this way, it may be
possible to give a conceptual description of “cyberattacks,” but still impossible
to put that concept into a sufficiently legalistic formulation. The cited policy
papers, including the 23 listed Online Harms, likewise accept that various
misdeeds in the cyber world can be illustrated and conceptualized. However, the
inability to create precise definitions suggests that laws should be aimed more at
the policy-oriented tactical level (resilience and recovery), rather than the
operational level (powers and liabilities), which directly impinges on individual
rights.
B. LAW AS AN APPROPRIATE REGULATORY INSTRUMENT IN CYBERSPACE
Aside from the troublesome definition of “cyberattack,” cyberspace
attributes of transnationality, instantaneity, and accessibility make national or
transnational levels of legal regulation troublesome to devise or enforce. This
point has been highlighted by the works of Professor Lessig, who argues that
computer coding, as the ultimate architect of cyberspace, rather than traditional
legal instruments, may represent a more availing approach to the nightmares of
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cyberspace.55 This analysis is criticized by some authors. Computer coding’s
regulatory success may not be markedly better than sovereign legislation
because of the open texture of coding.56 Furthermore, regulation by private
sector coding is damaging to constitutionalism in that the algorithms and codes
of conduct are not democratically considered nor always published.57
Yet, the evidence of the policy papers, whether Online Harms or the
National Cyber Security Strategy statements, points heavily towards
heterarchical arrangements, public-private cooperation, and reliance on nonstate actors. As stated in the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021
document: “The Government alone cannot provide for all aspects of the nation’s
cyber security. An embedded and sustainable approach is needed where citizens,
industry and other partners in society and government, play their full part in
securing our networks, services and data . . . .”58
Four provisos apply to the doubts cast on traditional style legislation in the
realm of cyberspace. First, the masters of cyberspace have become much more
receptive in recent years to state regulation. The philosophy of John Perry
Barlow is ebbing away. Instead, the big technology companies have assumed
the mantle of established big businesses with corporate mentalities; they are no
longer a fringe movement for libertarian nerds. Tellingly, Mark Zuckerberg, cofounder of Facebook, stated in 2019, “We need a more active role for
governments and regulators.”59 This cultural transformation is reflected in levels
of cooperation regarding the takedown of materials. For instance, the Counter
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) was launched by the U.K.’s
Association of Chief Police Officers in 2010,60 to encourage “a civic challenge
against material that [the public] find offensive, even if it is not illegal.”61 By
2012, it had received 2,025 alerts, and 10 percent of impugned webpages were
removed on grounds of illegality.62 By 2018, 304,000 takedowns had been
arranged without resort to any legislation.63
Second, politicians have also become emboldened to take on the Internet
giants after witnessing instances of their transgressive behavior, such as by
Cambridge Analytica and Facebook. This challenge is reflected in the policy
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statements already covered. It is also patent in the recent Christchurch Call,64
following the attacks on New Zealand mosques by Brenton Tarrant in March
2019, which have been seized upon as an opportunity to propagate worldwide
the regulatory blueprints being espoused in the U.K. and the EU (but not in the
U.S., which declined to attend the meeting or endorse its edicts).65 Whether the
Christchurch killings were a cyberattack is itself debatable—the attack was
kinetic and not cyber in nature, though some of the mobilization and planning
did involve Internet communications, as well as the live streaming of parts of
the events.
Third, governments have become emboldened to discuss cyberattacks and
even their offensive cyber capability.66 Thus, unlike the coyness overlaying the
Stuxnet attack on Iran in 2010,67 the U.S. announced that it had carried out a
cyberattack on Iranian tracking systems in 2019 following the downing of a
drone in the Persian Gulf.68 More generally, U.S. Cyber Command has published
its aggressive strategy—constant engagement and seizing the initiative—for the
whole world to apprehend.69 This public admission of capabilities and actions
will make legal regulation much more feasible.
Fourth, cyberspace facilitators are not entirely to be trusted to look after
themselves or the public. For instance, a recent statement by the Bank of England
pointed to the dangers of leaving to the private sector responses to state
sponsored cyberattacks. The regulator feared that the banks will restore
corrupted systems in order to reduce the reputational costs of outages which they
commercially prioritize over standards of security.70 Consequently,
governments must retain a public-interest-oriented role in regulating Internet
intermediaries within national borders.71
In conclusion, it is possible to conceptualize the value of an effective and
fair intervention by domestic law in response to a cyberattack. Such laws could
have meaning and support. But the environment of the Internet does entail limits
on the scope for domestic laws, and it is noticeable that the most ambitious plans
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seem to take shape in a multilateral context where symbolism can mask the lack
of more concrete action.
Before moving on to the possible legal counter cyberattack catalogue, a note
of caution should be entered by considering important side constraints. “Don’t
be evil,” the motto once used in Google’s corporate code of conduct, or the more
expansive Alphabet maxim of “do the right thing,” (as of 2015)72 is a valuable
reminder that fairness and individual rights must be respected or even deepened
along the way. Thus, a legal response can only be legitimate if it advances
objectives in ways which are fair as well as efficient and effective. Fairness will
give rise to considerations relating to the protection of free expression and due
process. These values are difficult to enforce against the private actors in control
of Internet infrastructure, especially if profits seem more important to them than
political freedoms. The Online Harms document uses this demand as an
argument for public regulation, by viewing the state as more trustworthy than
the private sector.
III. MEANINGFUL DOMESTIC LAW RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL
CYBERATTACK AS AN AGENDA
The second part of this paper considers the contents of a meaningful
domestic law agenda in response to a transnational cyberattack. The potential
domestic legal agenda could be both tactical and operational. At the tactical
level, there are broad legal duties which relate to resilience and recovery. At the
operational level, themes include: police powers, criminal offenses, and civil
sanctions.
A. TACTICAL INTERVENTIONS
The agenda to be addressed here involves the broad tasks of resilience and
recovery. In the U.K., such notions are the subject of the Civil Contingencies
Act 2004, Part I. Those “responders” who are covered by the legislation include
many government and public agencies and also “person[s] who provide a public
electronic communications network which makes telephone services available
(whether for spoken communication or for the transmission of data).”73 This
definition of “responders” does not include most CSP providers but is limited to
enterprises providing network structures. These responders bear broad planning
and investment duties established by law. This work is overseen by the Cabinet
Office, a U.K. government department.74 In the National Risk Register of Civil
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Emergencies, the Cabinet Office lists cyberattacks as one of the important risks
to be addressed.75
In addition to the sectors covered by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the
U.K. government employs the concept “Critical National Infrastructure” (CNI),
of which “communications” forms one of 13 sectors.76 Resilience planning for
that sector includes the edict, “Telecoms & Internet; Broadcast: To work with
industry to assess the risk posed to the sector by cyber-attack and prolonged
power loss.”77 This work is aided by the Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure,78 which provides advice and assistance to those who have
responsibility for protecting relevant assets, most of which are held in private
ownership. This private ownership can create barriers to information transfer
and trust.79 The resilience planning mainly takes the form of collaborative and
non-legislative corporatist style engagement, a mode which also applies to work
beyond the CNI.80
Another area in which legislation has intervened is exemplified by Directive
(EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council, which concerns
measures for a high common level of security for networks and information
systems across the Union.81 This Directive became U.K. law under the Network
and Information Systems Regulations 2018.82 The Directive places requirements
on bodies providing essential services in CNI sectors so as to ensure security and
resilience of networks and IT systems. Regulation 3(2) designates the
Information Commissioner as the national competent authority for relevant
digital service providers (RDSPs). Regulation 4 designates a “single point of
contact” (SPOC) for the U.K., and regulation 5 designates the U.K.’s computer
security incident response team (which is CERT-U.K.), as required by the
Directive.83 The computer security incident response team should respond to
cybersecurity incidents, engage in a coordination network for the purposes of
information sharing, ensure that essential services and suppliers have
appropriate security measures in place and report serious cybersecurity incidents
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to national authorities. Part 3 allows for the designation of operators of essential
services (OES). Each OES must fulfil the security duties set out in regulation 10
and the duty to notify incidents set out in regulation 11. Part 4 of the Regulations
sets out the duties which apply to RDSPs and the Information Commissioner,
including a duty on all RDSPs to register with the Information Commissioner.
Part 5 makes provision for powers of enforcement and penalties which apply to
contraventions of the duties. A threshold for applicability to the digital
infrastructure subsector applies under Schedule 2 paragraph 10, so that the
Regulations are applicable only to Top Level Domain (TLD) Name Registries,
Domain Name System (DNS) Service Providers, and Internet Exchange Point
(IXP) Operators. Thus, even under the NIS Directive, there is very limited
applicability to the Internet sector.
In the U.S., it was more difficult to secure comprehensive legislation on
resilience planning,84 but some progress was made through Executive Order
13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and Presidential Policy
Directive-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This Executive
Order seeks to develop a cybersecurity framework by promoting and
incentivizing the adoption of cybersecurity standards and practices through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and by encouraging cyber threat
information sharing.85 The Presidential Policy Directive-21 directs government
officials to address cyber working vulnerabilities and failures, to advance publicprivate partnerships, and to update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.86
However, after subsequent security breaches and cyberattacks, Executive Order
13691 was added to encourage and promote sharing of cybersecurity threat
information within the private sector and between the public and private sectors.
After this, Congress passed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015,87 which builds on the
existing initiatives and establishes legal platforms for cybersecurity information
sharing between private sector and federal government entities (with the
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center in the
Department for Homeland Security as the gateway) and for the monitoring of
information systems and defensive measures (such as blocking but not
destruction or hacking the facilities of the intruders, which would be offensive
measures). It also implements a range of measures intended to improve the
cybersecurity preparedness of critical information systems and networks. Even
so, there is no public law duty to share information or to warn.
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More general regulatory duties might in the future be imposed by the
regulatory intervention under the U.K. national proposals in the Online Harms
paper. Under this document:88
The government will establish a new statutory duty of care to
make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their
users and tackle harm caused by content or activity on their
services. Compliance with this duty of care will be overseen and
enforced by an independent regulator.89
The proposed statutory duty of care will require companies to take reasonable
steps to keep users safe and prevent third parties from being harmed as a direct
consequence using their services. The fulfilment of this duty will be overseen
and enforced by an independent regulator. A civil action at the behest of the
victim is not envisaged. Less direct enforcement might involve the invocation
of some variant of the Digital Economy Act 2017, section 103, which allows for
a code of practice for providers of online social media platforms to be issued by
the Secretary of State where conduct online is directed at an individual, and
involves bullying or insulting the individual, or other behavior likely to
intimidate or humiliate the individual. However, “cyberattack” is not one of the
twenty-three listed harms and the term appears only once (in connection with
products rather than usage or content).90 So, it would require further extension
of an already controversially wide duty to demand protective action by
regulation against transnational cyberattack.
B. OPERATIONAL INTERVENTIONS
1. Police Powers
A full upgrade of policing powers to investigate harms which make use of
telephonic communications, Internet and data collections, has recently been
undertaken in the U.K. via the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
Following review,91 the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IP Act 2016) has
radically overhauled electronic surveillance but left untouched other relevant
aspects of the Police Act 1997 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000.92 The IP Act 2016 regulates the interception of communications (Part 2,
chapter 1), acquisition and retention of communications data (Part 3, chapter 2
and Part 4), equipment interference (Part 5), bulk surveillance (Part 6), and bulk
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personal datasets (Part 7). These are all subject to Part 1, whereby the IP Act
2016 loftily sets out “General Privacy Protections.” These impose four
mandatory tests on the person authorizing the intervention: first, whether the
objective could reasonably be achieved through less intrusive means; second,
whether a higher level of protection is applied to sensitive information; third,
whether there is due regard to the public interest in protecting the “integrity and
security” of communications; fourth, whether “any other public interest in the
protection of privacy”93 is considered. In general, authorizations to engage in
surveillance within the IP Act 2016 are subject to approval by Judicial
Commissioners who, under section 23, “apply the same principles as would be
applied by a court on an application for judicial review’.”94 In practice, the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner Office has indicated an enhanced standard
of review.95 Yet, whereas the arrangement is described as a “double lock”
(alongside the government minister who initiates the action), it is not an “equal
lock” in terms of allowing a de novo inquiry.96
Three types of interception warrants replace the former single warrant
regime: targeted interception, examination, and mutual assistance warrants (Part
2). The grounds upon which warrants can be granted are for: national security,
preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom. The latter two grounds will be accepted so far as
they are also relevant to the interests of national security. Before granting initial
authorization, the Secretary of State must deem the warrant necessary, that the
conduct is proportionate to its objectives, and that satisfactory safeguards have
been arranged. Other than in urgent cases, before execution, the warrant must
then be approved by a judicial commissioner. Enhanced safeguards apply to
parliamentarians, legally privileged communications, and journalistic material
and sources.
Parts 3 and 4 of the IP Act 2016, dealing with the acquisition and retention
of communications data (the “who,” “when,” and “where” of a communication,
but not its content) remain subject to attack by litigation. Indeed, the extensive
grounds upon which an authorization can be granted have been held unlawful
by domestic courts,97 and the government has already conceded the need to
amend the IP Act 2016 version of retention powers.98 The government has also
set up an Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA) under the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner, to review requests for communications
data made by U.K. authorities before they are processed by communication
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providers.99 This development was in response to criticisms by the European
Court of Justice in Joined Cases Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Watson.100
Equipment interference, under Part 5, also known as computer network
exploitation (CNE), has only been publicly affirmed by the U.K. government
since early 2015,101 an “avowal,” as it has become known, which responded to
adverse litigation.102 Prior to the IP Act 2016, equipment interference was
vaguely alluded to in sections 5 and 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.
These two sections have been replaced with 37 sections in the IP Act 2016, Part
5, and a Code of Practice that runs to 147 pages.103 Applications for warrants
follow the same scheme as interception warrants: there are targeted warrants and
targeted examination warrants. It is open to the intelligence services, law
enforcement, and defense intelligence to apply for a warrant, which requires
judicial approval.
Bulk warrants104 are available in respect to each of the substantive resources
under the IP Act 2016, Part 6, so interception, acquisition of communications
data, and equipment interference are all potentially covered, as well as bulk
personal datasets in Part 7. The relevant Code of Practice describes “Bulk
Personal Datasets” as including “personal data relating to a number of
individuals, and the nature of that set is such that the majority of individuals
contained within it are not, and are unlikely to become, of interest to the
intelligence agencies in the exercise of their statutory functions.”105 Only the
security agencies may invoke bulk collection powers. The bulk interception and
equipment interference warrants are to serve overseas intelligence gathering
purposes,106 but bulk acquisition of communications data can be internal. The
application process broadly mirrors the scheme in respect to each discrete
resource. Extra safeguards exist for parliamentarians, legal professional
privilege, and journalistic materials or sources.
It seems hardly desirable now to go further—for the sake of more specific
protection against cyberattacks—so soon after such major extensions of the law.
One possibility, already raised, would be to build on the precedent of the concept
of “hostile activity” in the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019,
schedule 3, to allow for suspicionless (and warrantless) inquiries regarding the
borderless Internet. However, the counterargument would be that hostile activity
is applied in schedule 3, to state activity and only at borders. To afford extra

99
793 Parl Deb HC col. 1289 (2018) (UK); see also About Us, https://www.gov.uk/
government/organisations/office-for-communications-data-authorisations/about (last visited Oct. 22,
2019).
100
Joined cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen, and Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t v Watson, 2017 E.C.R. 788; see also Home Office Investigatory Powers Act
Response, supra note 98, at 4–5; The Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations, 2018 SI 2018 /1123,
sch. 2 (UK).
101
HOME OFF., DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE ON EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE, 2016, ¶ 1.3 (UK).
102
Privacy Int’l v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2016] IPT 14/85/CH, 14/120126/CH, [2]–[3], [34]–[35] (judgement issued Feb. 12, 2016).
103
HOME OFF., DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE ON EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE, 2017, ¶ 1.1 (UK).
104
See also DAVID ANDERSON, REPORT OF THE BULK POWERS REVIEW ¶ 2.19 (2016) (UK).
105
HOME OFF., DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE ON INTELLIGENCE SERVICES’ RETENTION AND USE OF
BULK PERSONAL DATASETS, ¶ 2.2 (2017) (UK).
106
Examination warrants under s.15(3) can sidestep this restriction.

72

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:1

powers on the same basis as investigating cyberattacks potentially committed by
anyone within the jurisdiction, would undermine the regulated scheme of the IP
Act 2016. Also, this would create endless possibilities of general searches. The
damage to fairness by intrusion upon privacy rights is evident. Perhaps, the only
exception might be a power of compulsory repair, if a hardware or software
vulnerability to hostility activity is found through surveillance under the IP
Act.107
2. Offenses
Criminal law has the potential to serve several functions mitigating
cyberattacks. Firstly, criminal law may be a better option than civil law in
dealing with online wrongdoings, as it seeks to punish and deter aberrant
conduct in the interests of the public rather than a self-selected litigant.108 Civil
law may not place sufficient restrictions on the perpetrator’s liberty to prevent
future attacks or to reassure victims or the wider community. Apart from
deterrence, criminal law can allow for early intervention through the
criminalization of preparatory acts which protect citizens from future harm.109
In addition, criminal law may be utilized to impose the duty on the public “to
help themselves and the state.”110 Just as the employees of the financial sectors
are obliged to report their suspicion of terrorist financing to a central authority,
so too may criminal law be used to persuade the public to report the occurrence
of cyberattacks. Next, criminal law encourages solidarity in managing
cyberattacks.111 Thus, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime was
formulated in order to overcome the inconsistencies of cybercrime legislation
among states112 and seeks to foster cooperation among states to suppress
cybercrime. It has been backed by the EU Cybercrime Directive, which requires
national adoption of corresponding legislative measures.113 However, the
effectiveness of the Cybercrime Convention depends on the willingness of the
state parties to cooperate. Any attempts to pursue cybercriminals in other
jurisdictions must be made in tandem with the local enforcement authorities.
Accordingly, the cost of criminal enforcement may be high. However, mutual
legal assistance concerning cybercrime “offers a means of controlling harmful
activities that, if unchecked, would result in very high costs for victims and the
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wider community.”114 Cyberattacks can even harm national security objectives
“to protect our people; to project our global influence; and to promote our
prosperity.”115
Cybercrimes can be divided into three groups: (1) computer integrity
crimes; (2) computer related crimes; and (3) computer content crimes.116 Outside
of the purview of war crimes, the application of international crimes under the
Rome Statute for cyberattacks seems somewhat distant,117 so the main focus
should be on domestic law. For the U.K., these crimes are largely set out in the
Computer Misuse Act 1990.118 Of particular relevance to cyberattacks is section
3ZA, dealing with “[u]nauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious
damage.”119 The offense is in line with the EU Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks
against information systems, which emphasizes the need to ensure protection of
the critical national infrastructure against cyberattacks, including the imposition
of heavier criminal sanctions.120 So, section 3ZA deals with the most serious
cyberattacks and provides heavier sentencing to reflect the gravity of these
offenses. The amendment was made in 2015, and it also confers the courts with
extraterritorial jurisdiction and extends the scope of section 3A of the Computer
Misuse Act 1990 to cover articles for personal use.121 Under section 3ZA, a
person is guilty of an offense (punishable by up to 14 years of imprisonment or
life where there is serious damage to human welfare or to national security) if:
(1) . . .
(a) the person does any unauthorized act in relation to a
computer;
(b) at the time of doing the act the person knows that it is
unauthorized;
(c) the act causes, or creates a significant risk of, serious
damage of a material kind; and
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(d) the person intends by doing the act to cause serious
damage of a material kind or is reckless as to whether such
damage is caused.
(2) Damage is of a “material kind” for the purposes of this
section if it is—
(a) damage to human welfare in any place;
(b) damage to the environment of any place;
(c) damage to the economy of any country; or
(d) damage to the national security of any country.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) an act causes damage
to human welfare only if it causes—
(a) loss to human life;
(b) human illness or injury;
(c) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or
fuel;
(d) disruption of a system of communication;
(e) disruption of facilities for transport; or
(f) disruption of services relating to health.
Accordingly, the notion of harm for cyberattacks is broader than existing
criminal misuse offenses due to the potential forms of damage caused by the
attacks, which may go well beyond impacts on data or computers. However,
questions arise about these more exotic forms of harm.122 How does the court
determine the threat or harm to human welfare, economy and the national
security?123 Breadth is also a feature of the two part mens rea under section 3ZA.
First, the accused must know that he is committing an unauthorized act in
relation to a computer. Second, he must intend to cause the harm or act recklessly
as to whether such damage is caused.124 With regard to the second part, the
intention of the accused may be inferred from: the nature of the cyber weapon
used; the place where the damage was inflicted; the nature of the damages
caused; and the opportunity for commission. Cyberattacks are usually
premeditated, since they require extensive planning and technical expertise.
Nonetheless, these attacks may be committed recklessly, as when the accused
does not foresee that the cyberattack is likely to cause the damage of a kind
required under 3ZA, but there was sufficient evidence of its probability.
In addition to section 3ZA, preparatory offenses should also be given
consideration. Pursuant to Directive 2013/40/EU, the Serious Crime Act 2015,
section 41 (replacing an earlier version in the Police and Justice Act 2006,
section 37) inserted another offense into the Computer Misuse Act 1990 as
section 3A, which makes it an offense for anyone who makes, adapts, supplies
or offers to supply any article intending it to be used to commit, or to assist in
the commission of, an offense under section 1, 3 or 3ZA. This provision enables
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the police to intervene before the occurrence of an attack, when the offender has
procured the malware for their personal use.125 The Act also empowers U.K. law
enforcement agencies to initiate action against U.K. citizens who commit
cybercrimes whilst physically outside of the U.K. on the basis of their
nationality.126
In light of this legislative initiative, gaps in criminal law are not evident.
Instead, attention should be turned towards enforcement measures against
cyberattack. These might include a duty to report incidents to the Cyber
Emergency Response Team (CERT-UK).127 The reluctance of individuals and
private institutions to report the occurrence of cybercrime to the police hampers
the enforcement of the law.128 Their hesitation might arise because commitment
is to their own interests (including those of shareholders) which may prioritize
the stability of the market and public confidence. First, the financial institutions
do not want the public to know that their computer systems are vulnerable to any
attacks, even if reduction of that vulnerability would be for the common good.
Second, they may calculate that the cost of implementing security measures
exceeds the losses. Third, private owners may perceive that the duty to protect
national infrastructure is the responsibility of the state. Fourth, the imposition of
regulations will impair their ability to innovate. The European Commission has
proposed that member states should oblige operators of critical infrastructures
and public administrations to report serious incidents to national authorities.129
However, that proposal has been rejected by multiple states, including Sweden,
Ireland and the U.K.130 Both states and private financial institutions are reluctant
to share the information due to security reasons. Thus, the duty to report cyber
incidents may be difficult to implement. A more palatable reform might be to
strengthen the expertise of law enforcement officers dealing with
cyberattacks.131 Yet, the imposition of compulsory formal competencies for such
officers would be criticized for its cost and effectiveness.132
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3. Civil Law Measures
Non-criminal measures, including preventative strategies and civil action,
may be used to counter cyberattacks.133 Protective security measures are vital to
protect societal interests, rather than concentrating on the individual offender
and victim. Protective security measures against cyberattacks might be based on
a variety of approaches. The most indirect approach would be the improvement
of social conditions by creating employment and educational opportunities. For
instance, Brenner and Clarke suggested incentivizing civilians to prevent
cybercrime.134
More directly, protective security could impede the occurrence of crime.
Target hardening is especially important, as cyberattacks are often premeditated.
Besides making dangerous technical devices more difficult to obtain (as per the
Computer Misuse Act 1990, section 3A), other tactics may be used. They
include: installing antivirus software and encryption; encouraging compliance
with good technical standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 for information security
management;135 ensuring that IT appliances and computer systems are
constantly updated and improved; controlling access to usernames and web
equipment; and restricting the usage of electronic devices.
A more ambitious scheme of regulatory target-hardening has been adopted
by the European Union. By Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology
cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013
(Cybersecurity Act), ENISA has been reformulated as the EU Agency for
Cybersecurity. This agency will take the lead in maintaining the European
Cybersecurity Certification framework by which multiple schemes will be
created for different categories of ICT products, processes, and services. Each
scheme will specify, inter alia, the type of ICT products, services, and processes
covered, the purpose, security standards, and evaluation methods. Using a
European Cybersecurity Certificate, a private sector company will be able to
demonstrate the security of its products. Though certification is voluntary for
four years, it may not remain so thereafter, given the EU’s ambitions as a
globally influential cybersecurity norm-setter.136 Various concerns have been
raised with respect to this approach, including the practical ability to centralize
under one relatively small public authority, the proficiency of the vast and everchanging nature of digital industry products, the agency’s ability to access
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information about vulnerabilities (some of which may be national security
secrets),137 and the costs of an effective scheme.
Apart from protective security measures, states are using technological
measures, such as Blockchain, in dealing with cyberattacks. For instance,
Estonia uses keyless signature infrastructure in which electronic activity is
verified mathematically on the Blockchain without the intervention of a system
administrator or government staff.138 While centralized authorities and services
are vulnerable to cyberattacks as they amass and manage troves of data,
Blockchain distributes and shares the data in immutable database ledgers across
a peer-to-peer network.139 Public and private institutions no longer own and
control data as the Blockchain technology breaks the centralization of the
Internet. Blockchain ensures the confidentiality and authenticity of the data as it
uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to establish a highly secure platform.140
However, the implementation of Blockchain technology is challenging, as not
many potential users understand its applications and implications. Furthermore,
Blockchain faces hurdles such as capacity problems, system failures, and
technically inexperienced users.141 Thus, Blockchain may not be an immediate
solution to the phenomenon of cyberattacks, but it has promising potential for
providing long-lasting answers to this problem.
In addition to general prevention through regulation, civil law can also be
applied as a form of reaction to actual or anticipated cyberattacks. First, victims
may initiate a civil action for ‘economic’ or ‘intentional’ torts against the
perpetrators of cyberattacks.142 Negligence actions might also be considered.143
Besides damages, other remedies could include injunctions and restraining
orders. In 2010, a federal judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia granted Microsoft’s request for a temporary restraining order
against almost three-hundred Internet Domains.144 A group of criminals known
as Waledac used these domains to facilitate and continuously control the ability
of the computers to communicate with each other as Botnets.
A civil remedy, such as an injunction, also may be invoked to respond to
cyberattacks in the U.K. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 3A,
provides for an injunction to restrain any person from pursuing conduct that
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amounts to harassment.145 The victims of cyberattacks may use this remedy to
stop perpetrators from making their lives intolerable through constant computer
system intrusions. In the case of Huntingdon Life Sciences Group v. Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, the claimant initiated an action against the
respondent for conducting an unlawful campaign to promote its closure. The
claimant contended that the respondent organization had the aim of making life
intolerable for its employees. An interim injunction was granted on the balance
of convenience, when the claimants demonstrated a good arguable claim and
serious questions to be tried.146 In Astrazeneca U.K. Ltd. v. Vincent, an interim
injunction was granted to Astrazeneca U.K. Ltd., a pharmaceutical company
related to Huntingdon Life Sciences.147 When states are involved in
cyberattacks, injunctions may be less applicable because of state immunity.148
For corresponding state-oriented wrongdoing, the application of economic
sanctions might be considered. This idea was applied to cyberattacks by the U.S.
government under Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015: Blocking the
Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities. This was followed by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016:
Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to
Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities. This instrument was passed as
a declared national emergency under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act to combat cyberattacks continually launched at the U.S., initially
with a view to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections,
though the orders are set on a permanent basis.149 To date, there has been modest
invocation. The targets are the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (the
Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie or GRU) and the Federal Security
Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or FSB), plus four individual
intelligence heads. Some have also called for these organizations to be
designated as terrorist groups under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.150 One attendant difficulty is to identify a labeled entity as
state-based as opposed to collectives of likeminded sympathizers.151 There also
arise dangers from sanctioning state organizations as terrorists; for instance, the
sanctioning of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian
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armed forces, raised potential problems in humanitarian law and the danger of
reprisals.152
Because of concerns about the increased ability and willingness of state and
non-state actors to pursue their objectives by undertaking malicious cyber
activities, the Council of the EU adopted conclusions on June 19, 2017 on a
framework for a joint diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘the
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’).153 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of May 17,
2019, concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the
Union or its Member States, was later passed.154 The measures include the
freezing of funds and economic resources of any persons and entities listed in
Annex I, to the Council Regulation and ensuring that funds and economic
resources are not made available to them or for their benefit. To fall within the
scope of this regime, the cyberattacks must have significant impact, and
originate from, use infrastructure or be carried out by persons operating outside
the EU. For the U.K., implementation has been undertaken by the Cyber-Attacks
(Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2019.155
The use of sanctions in this way faces obstacles. Some cyberattacks may
originate outside the EU. Even against identified assailants, the impact is
uncertain. One might compare, first, the alleged attackers of Litvinenko—by the
Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun Freezing Order 2016,156 made under
sections 4 and 14 and Schedule 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001. The Order has two notable features. One is that Vladimir Putin is not on
the list, even though he was named by Sir Robert Owen in the Litvinenko Inquiry
report as probably responsible.157 The second is that the use of the 2001 Act
takes the basis beyond terrorism—section 4 is invoked on the basis that “action
constituting a threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of the United
Kingdom or residents of the United Kingdom has been or is likely to be taken
by a person or persons.”158 Thus, state terrorism is treated differently than substate terrorism.
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A second problematic use of sanctions concerns the alleged Salisbury
attacks in March 2018, on Sergei Skripal, his daughter Yulia, and police
investigator Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey.159 Charlie Rowley and Dawn
Sturgess also came into contact with the Novichok poison, and Sturgess was
killed.160 Russian state agents were blamed by the Prime Minister.161 The
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) later confirmed
the accusations of the United Kingdom government relating to the identity of the
toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury.162 Subsequently, the Crown
Prosecution Service, announced charges against two Russian officials:
Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov.163 The charges included counts under
the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, but did not include any mention of terrorism
or the murder of Dawn Sturgess. The latter was confirmed by the OPCW to be
related to the same Novichok agent as in the Skripal cases.164 Denials from the
suspects and Russian government have also been aired. One response to these
episodes was a new scheme of economic sanctions. The European Union
sanctions, issued under what became Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542,165
were implemented in the U.K. by the Chemical Weapons (Asset-Freezing) and
Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2018.166 Diplomatic expulsions were
also implemented (twenty-three from the U.K. and others from more than twenty
other countries),167 but neither the expulsions nor the sanctions have produced
any discernible progress toward criminal process, civil remedies, or diplomatic
cooperation.168
To conclude, sanctions in response to a cyberattack do not seem to be a
promising counterpart to financial sanctions for financial misconduct. The
perpetrator is not easily identifiable in the first place since ‘know your customer’
rules do not apply to access to the Internet. Next, in hybrid warfare, the
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perpetrator may, in reality, be a non-state person or group with no discernible
assets or intention to travel to the sanctioning jurisdiction. In the case of direct
state responsibility, the victim state will suffer from reluctance to identify the
alleged villains since there are always pressing needs to maintain dialogue with
them about other issues of public policy. It is also notable that all the foregoing
are unilateral sanctions systems, not endorsed by the United Nations, which also
diminishes the prospects for success.
CONCLUSION
Law is an imperfect instrument in cyberspace, especially when responding
to transnational cyberattacks. It must contend not only with the difficult
attributes of transnationality, instantaneity, and accessibility, but also must
overcome an overlay of political calculations, which make courtrooms an
unappealing venue for the settling of international scores. Resolutions, such as
diplomatic discussions, containment through surveillance, and even retaliation
by way of countermeasures, often seem more appealing.
It follows that a broad array of countermeasures should be considered. The
EU Commission has placed twenty-two measures into its toolbox against hybrid
threats,169 and these did not preclude building resilience, detecting, preventing,
and responding to the threats via Member States’ domestic law, which remains
the predominant instrument. The European Commission is surely right to
conclude that “a whole-of-society approach—government, civil society, private
sector, including, inter alia, media and online platforms—is at the core of our
counter-hybrid policies.”170 But it recognizes that responding to threats lies
predominantly with member states, as it is intrinsically linked to national
security and defense policies. At that level, much work has been done with
legislation for criminal offenses and forms of civil action, but the law in action
by way of prevention, investigation, or enforcement remains more nascent.
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